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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the hottest topics of emerging technologies of war is autonomous
weapons systems (AWS). Within the field, legal and ethical questions are as
prominent as technical ones, and two camps seem to have emerged. The first seeks
to ban autonomous weapons entirely,' and the second recognizes their inevitability
and seeks to regulate them.2
A leader of the first group (demanding a total ban) has been Human Rights
Watch (HRW).' In a major paper, entitled Losing Humanity: The Case Against
Killer Robots, HRW-aided by Harvard Law School's International Human Rights
Clinic (IHRC)-attempted to establish that fully autonomous weapons "would not
be consistent with international humanitarian law and would increase the risk of
death or injury to civilians during armed conflict." 4 Accordingly, the report
concluded that a "preemptive prohibition on their development and use is
needed."'
However, that effort was rather thoroughly deconstructed by Professor
Michael Schmitt, Director of the Stockton Center for the Study of International
Law at the U.S. Naval War College, in a rebuttal entitled, Autonomous Weapon
Systems and International Humanitarian Law: A Reply to the Critics." Schmitt
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Ethics and National Security, Duke Law School, http://web.law.duke.edullens/ C 2016.
1. See, e.g., CAMPAIGN TO STOP KILLER ROBOTS, http://www.stopkillerrobots.org/ (last
visited Apr. 14, 2016).
2 Michael Schmitt, Regulating Autonomous Weapons Might be Smarter Than Banning
Them, JsT SECURITY (Aug. 10, 2015, 9:00 AM), https://www.justsecurity.org/25333/regulating-
autonomous-weapons-smarter-banning/.
3. CAMPAIGN TO STOP KILLER ROBOTS, supra note 1.
4. Losing Humanity: The Case Against Killer Robots, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & INT'L
HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC HARV. L. SCHOOL 1 (2012), http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files
/reports/arms 1112ForUpload_00.pdf [hereinafter Losing Humanity]. The paper defines "fully
autonomous" weapons as referring "to both out-of-the-loop weapons and those that allow a
human on the loop, but that are effectively out-of-the-loop weapons because the supervision is so
limited." Id. at 2. Additionally, the report defines "out-of-the-loop weapons" as being "[r]obots
that are capable of selecting targets and delivering force without any human input or interaction."
Id.
5. Id. at1.
6. Michael N. Schmitt, Autonomous Weapon Systems and International Humanitarian Law:
A Reply to the Critics, HARV. NAT'L SEC. J. FEATURES (Feb. 5, 2013, 2:07 PM), http://harvard
nsj.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Schmitt-Autonomous-Weapon-Systems-and-IHL-Final.pdf
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found that a "principal flaw in the analysis is a blurring of the distinction between
international humanitarian law's prohibitions on weapons per se and those on the
unlawful use of otherwise lawful weapons."7 He went on to convincingly conclude
"that autonomous weapon systems are not unlawful per se,"8 adding:
Their autonomy has no direct bearing on the probability they would
cause unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury, does not preclude
them from being directed at combatants and military objectives, and
need not result in their having effects that an attacker cannot control.
Individual systems could be developed that would violate these norms,
but autonomous weapon systems are not prohibited on this basis as a
category.9
While it may be that the HRW/IHRC's report was (and is) popular among
anti-autonomous non-governmental organization (NGO) weapons groups,' it
evidently did not make much headway with States because, as of 2015, as "many
as 40 nations are currently developing military robotics."" Still, the Future of Life
Institute gained considerable publicity recently" when it distributed an "open
letter" signed by many artificial intelligence developers (and others), which called
for a "ban on offensive autonomous weapons beyond meaningful human control.""
Apparently undeterred, HRW/IHRC renewed its effort with a new paper
released in April of 2015 entitled, Mind the Gap: The Lack of Accountability for
Killer Robots.14 This report replays many themes from the previous effort-and
comes up with the same outright ban recommendation-but somewhat alters its
tact towards that end." This time, it seems that autonomous weapons should be
banned because they claim "[n]either criminal law nor civil law guarantees
adequate accountability for individuals directly or indirectly involved in the use of
7. Id. at 2.
8. Id. at 35.
9. Id.
10. See, e.g., The Problem, CAMPAIGN TO STOP KILLER ROBOTS, https://www.stopkiller
robots.org/the-problem/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2016) (linking to the HRW/IHRC report).
11. Steven Groves, The U.S. Should Oppose the U.N.'s Attempt to Ban Autonomous
Weapons, HERITAGE FOUND. (Mar. 5, 2015), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015
/03/the-us-should-oppose-the-uns-attempt-to-ban-autonomous-weapons.
12. See, e.g., Daniel Victor, Elon Musk and Stephen Hawking Among Hundreds to Urge
Ban on Military Robots, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/28/
technology/elon-musk-and-stephen-hawking-among-hundreds-to-urge-ban-on-military-
robots.html.
13. Autonomous Weapons: An Open Letter from Al & Robotics Researchers, FUTURE OF
LIFE INST., http://futureoflife.org/open-letter-autonomous-weapons/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2016).
Besides the issue as to what phrase "offensive" autonomous weapons would encompass, it is also
not explained as to why non-offensive autonomous weapons "beyond meaningful human control"
would not likewise be objectionable. Id.
14. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & INT'L HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC HARV. L. SCHOOL, MIND THE
GAP: THE LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY FOR KILLER ROBOTS (2015),
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/arms04l5_ForUpload_0.pdf [hereinafter MIND
THE GAP].
15. Id at 6-7.
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fully autonomous weapons."'
The purpose of this article is to briefly examine Mind the Gap to see how it
relates to legal actualities as to accountability. It will conclude that it deviates from
accountability in material ways, and finds that this new tact is even more
egregiously flawed than HRW/IHRC's original approach. In point of fact, although
no one can "guarantee" accountability, there are sufficient legal tools to do so
when appropriate; autonomous weapons are not somehow exempted from legal
regimes applicable to other weapons or the law of war more generally. This article
will conclude-as others have-that it is better to develop norms to control these
systems than to attempt to ban them outright.
II. THE THRESHOLD QUESTION: IS PERSONAL ACCOUNTABILITY AN ESSENTIAL
ELEMENT OF THE LEGALITY OF A WEAPON?
In presenting its contentions, HRW/IHRC seems to confuse the issue of
personal accountability with the legality of a weapons system itself. In fact,
international law has no such requirement, and Mind the Gap identifies none. 7
Article 36 of Protocol 1 of the Geneva Conventions does call upon parties to
"determine whether its employment would, in some or all circumstances, be
prohibited by this Protocol or by any other rule of international law."'. The
Protocol focuses weapons' legality on whether it can be "directed at a specific
military objective," and prohibits those which are "of a nature to strike military
objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction.""
For its part, the United States-which is not a party to Protocol I-does not
recognize Article 36 as part of customary international law, but conducts such
reviews as a matter of long standing policy.2 0 These reviews follow standard
international law in that they ask the following questions: (1) whether the
weapon's intended use is calculated to cause superfluous injury; (2) whether the
weapon is inherently indiscriminate; and (3) whether the weapon falls within a
class of weapons that has been specifically prohibited.2'
16. Id at 1.
17. See id. at 13-17 (discussing the importance of personal accountability); see also Jack
M. Beard, Autonomous Weapons and Human Responsibilities, 45 GEO. J. INT'L L., no. 3, 2014, at
617, 641 (discussing the lack of personal accountability imposed by international law regarding
the use of autonomous weapons).
18. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts [hereinafter Protocol I], art. 36, June 8,
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.
19. Id. at art. 51. The International Committee of the Red Cross considers these prohibitions
to be part of customary international law.
20. See U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., LAW OF WAR MANUAL, ¶ 19.20.1.2 (2015),
http://www.defense.gov/Portals/I /Documents/pubs/Law-of-War-Manual-June-2015.pdf
[hereinafter DOD MANUAL] (providing examples of AP I Provisions that are consistent with
longstanding U.S. practice).
21. See id. ¶ 6.2.2 (explaining the questions which need to be asked when determining
whether a weapon's acquisition or procurement is prohibited).
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There are other possible prohibitions on weapons-such as a specific treaty-
but no prohibition conditions legality on the ability to assign blame to a specific
individual.2 2 One of the world's foremost weapons' law authorities, Professor
William Boothby, unequivocally dismisses the suggestion that individual
accountability is an essential element of the legality of a weapon.23 He says:
The lawfulness of an autonomous weapon system under current international
law does not, in my view, turn on the ability or otherwise to fix any identifiable
individual with liability in the event of an unsatisfactory attack. Sometimes it will
be possible to assign responsibility to an identifiable individual, sometimes it will
not.2 4
This plainly reflects not only lex lata, but the practical realities of war. Yet
Mind the Gap wrongly conflates the imperative under international law to
investigate and prosecute "grave breaches" with the separate issue of the legality of
a particular weapon.2 5 Many, if not most, inarguably lawful weapons might still be
used in an unlawful manner, but that does not lead to calls for bans. The focus
should be on the way the system is used. To be clear, the International Committee
of the Red Cross makes the point unequivocally that "a weapon that can be used
with precision can also be abusively used against the civilian population. In this
case, it is not the weapon which is prohibited, but the method or the way in which
it is used."2 6
A. Does Personal Accountability Really Deter?
Mind the Gap seeks to support its thesis of individual liability by lecturing the
reader with an interpretation of the "Purposes of Criminal Responsibility." 27 That
rendition is mainly a rather basic recitation of the standard criminal justice themes
of deterrence and retribution, as well as what HRW/IHRC calls "compensatory
,21justice."
However, in the context of international criminal tribunals (ICT) convened to
judge atrocities and other grievous offenses against human rights,2 9 the utility of
personal accountability for the purpose of deterrence is debatable. Terminating
22. See, e.g., id
23. Email from Air Commodore William Boothby, Royal Air Force (Retired), Associate
Fellow at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy to author (Oct. 11, 2015, 5:26 PM) (on file with
author). Air Commodore Boothby is the author of WEAPONS AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT
(2009).
24. Id.
25. See MIND THE GAP, supra note 14, at 15-17 (explaining the link between international
humanitarian law and international criminal law in regard to international legal obligations).
26. Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, A Guide to the Legal Review of New Weapons, Means
and Methods of Warfare: Measures to Implement Article 36 of Additional Protocol I of 1977, 88
INT'L REV. RED CROSS 931, 936-37 (2006), https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/
irrc_864icrcgeneva.pdf.
27. See MIND THE GAP, supra note 14, at 14-15 (setting out this article's thesis).
28. Id
29. See id. at 15 (discussing international legal obligations in the context of international
criminal tribunals).
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conflicts and rebuilding societies after them is a complex task, and efforts to
impose individual liability in the name of deterrence against future acts may
actually prove to be counterproductive. As two scholars put it, there are "reasons to
be wary of the deterrence promise of ICT," and "it is dangerously naive to ignore
the possibility that ICT might not only lack any significant deterrence benefits, but
might actually exacerbate conflicts in weak states. 3 0
Furthermore, some experts question whether the psychology of war
criminals-and particularly that of the most egregious among them-is such that
they are even amenable to deterrence under any circumstances. Consider:
Many argue that war crimes tribunals offer no deterrent to potential
criminals whatsoever. People with strong convictions against a certain
religious or ethnic group will likely not feel any less hatred for that
group just because a possible tribunal looms in the future. Both Hitler
and Pol Pot believed they would be revered by future generations for the
extreme measures they took to change the makeup of their societies.
These leaders were inspired by their visions of the future and it is
unlikely the prospect of a war crimes tribunal would have swayed either
dictator.32
In their report, HRW/IHRC never really accounts for the markedly
diminished status of deterrence not only in the United States,33 but in the
international community generally (irrespective of any connection with
34
autonomous weapons). In fact, that community has largely rejected the most
coercive of all deterrents-the death penalty-in international tribunals.
More broadly, even the long-accepted principle of belligerent reprisal-
something explicitly aimed at deterring a belligerent from continuing to violate
international law-has been eviscerated by Protocol I's restrictions on reprisals,
even against objects.36 This is despite the fact that, as Professor Michael Newton,
an international law professor at Vanderbilt University Law School, argues,
"[r]easonable reprisals grounded on an empirical assessment of their deterrent
value or framed as appropriate punishment for prior acts of terror may be the most
morally acceptable and humane strategy for serving a strategic imperative of
30. Julian Ku & Jide Nzelibe, Do International Criminal Tribunals Deter or Exacerbate
Humanitarian Atrocities?, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 777, 833 (2006).
31. Chris McMorran, International War Crimes Tribunals, BEYOND INTRACTABILITY (July
2003), http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/int-war-crime-tribunals (last updated by Heidi
Burgess June 2013).
32. Id.
33. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, National Institute of Justice, Five Things About Deterrence
(July 2014), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/247350.pdf (examining the facts about
deterrence).
34. See Ku & Nzelibe, supra note 30, at 792-97 (discussing the theoretical logic behind the
deterrence model for punishing international crime through American and International
examples).
35. See generally WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (3d ed. 2002).
36. Protocol 1, supra note 18, at art. 20.
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civilized society."
To the extent that HRW/IHRC underpins their call for a ban on autonomous
weapons based on the indispensability of personal deterrence, that case has yet to
be made. Given the political reality that individual criminal accountability does not
always serve the strategic need for societal reconciliation, as well as the fact the
international community has progressively deconstructed the tools of traditional
deterrence, it is unclear that there is any significant contemporary norm to support
HRW/IHRC suppositions as to deterrence, qua deterrence, and the propriety of
their proposed ban on autonomous weapons.
B. Why Does HRW/IHRC Think Accountability Cannot be Achieved?
Perhaps the most puzzling part of Mind the Gap is their central thesis: that
there is not-and could not be-accountability for illicit use of autonomous
weapons.3 8 Inexplicably, they believe it is necessary to make the rather obvious
observation that "robots are not men" and go on to conclude in what we must
assume is a serious syllogism, that "fully autonomous weapons could not have the
mental state to make these wrongful actions crimes." 9 This, of course, is irrelevant,
as international law has never sought to impose criminal liability on weapons
themselves.40
As Professor Michael Schmitt41 points out, contentions about accountability
have "muddled" the debate about autonomous weapons. 42 As he observes, it is not
difficult to map out how it would be allocated:
Clearly, any commander who decides to launch AWS [autonomous
weapons systems] into a particular environment is, as with any other
weapon systems, accountable under international criminal law for that
decision. Nor will developers escape accountability if they design
systems, autonomous or not, meant to conduct operations that are not
IHL [international humanitarian law] compliant. And States can be held
accountable under the laws of State responsibility should their armed
37. Michael A. Newton, Reconsidering Reprisals, 20 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 361, 369
(2010).
38. See MIND THE GAP, supra note 14, at 25 (discussing the accountability gap inherent in
autonomous weaponry including the possibility of no criminal accountability at all).
39. Id. at 18.
40. Interestingly, in his book LIABILITY FOR CRIMES INVOLVING ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS (2015), Gabriel Hallevy argues that current criminal law-much
developed from criminal liability of corporations-could cause strange consequences, such as
criminal liability being imposed on machines. Whatever resonance this may have in domestic
law, or even international law outside of the law of war, it does not apply to the lawfulness of
weapons.
41. Professor Michael Schmitt is the Charles H. Stockton Professor of International Law
and Director of the Stockton Center for the Study of International Law at the U.S. Naval War
College. He is also Professor of Public International Law at the University of Exeter in the United
Kingdom.
42. Schmitt, Regulating Autonomous Weapons Might be Smarter Than Banning Them,
supra note 2.
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forces use AWS in an unlawful manner.43
Likewise, Professor Armin Krishnan, Assistant Professor for Security Studies
at East Carolina University, concludes in his book, Killer Robots: Legality and
Ethicality of Autonomous Weapons, that the "legal problems with regard to
accountability might be far smaller than some critics of military robots believe.""
He sensibly points out that if "the robot does not operate within the boundaries of
its specified parameters, it is the manufacturer's fault." 45 Similarly, he says that if
the robot is "used in circumstances that make its use illegal, then it is the
commander's fault." 4 6
But Mind the Gap assumes that "[a] gap could arise because fully autonomous
weapons by definition would have capacity to act autonomously and therefore
could launch independently and unforeseeably an indiscriminate attack against
civilians . . . ."47 Here, the question is: what system of justice in the civilized world
attempts to impose criminal liability on anyone when a machine does something
that was truly unforeseeable? If HRW/IHRC really wants to impose criminal
liability for unforeseeable events, then their issue is not with autonomous weapons,
it is with the fundamental precepts of criminal law in rule of law countries.4 8
Rather, a commander must have a reasonable understanding of the AWS and
how it will work before deploying it in a particular situation. In addition, as
Professor Peter Margulies of Roger Williams University School of Law argues,
commanders should exercise what he calls "dynamic diligence," which is a regime
which "will require frequent, periodic assessment and, where necessary,
adjustment of AWS inputs, outputs, and interface with human service members." 49
This approach, Margulies contends, is a practical version of what "meaningful
human control" would look like if that phrase were deployed to permit autonomy
while preserving checks on autonomy's excesses."
What degree of knowledge must a commander have about the workings of an
AWS in order to be considered reasonable? As it happens, the experts who
convened to study the application of the law of war to a related technology-
cyber-made a number of relevant observations:
Commanders or other superiors in the chain of command cannot be
expected to have a deep knowledge of cyber operations; to some extent,
43 Id
44. ARMIN KRISHNAN, KILLER ROBOTS: LEGALITY AND ETHICALITY OF AUTONOMOUS
WEAPONS 105 (2009).
45. Id
46. Id.
47. MIND THE GAP, supra note 14, at 19.
48. In the United States, for example, due process forbids vicarious criminal liability for
acts that are not reasonably foreseeable. See, e.g., Pinkerton v. U.S., 328 U.S. 640 (1946).
49. Peter Margulies, Making Autonomous Weapons Accountable: Command Responsibility
for Computer-Guided Lethal Force in Armed Conflicts, RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON REMOTE
WARFARE 19 (Jens David Ohlin ed., forthcoming 2016), http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract id=2734900.
50. Id. at 26.
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they are entitled to rely on the knowledge and understanding of their
subordinates. Nevertheless, the fact that cyber operations may be
technically complicated does not alone relieve commanders or other
superiors of the responsibility for exercising control over subordinates.
Of course, willful or negligent failure to acquire an understanding of
such operations is never a justification for lack of knowledge. As a
matter of law, commanders and other superiors are assumed to have the
same degree of understanding as a 'reasonable' commander at a
comparable level of command in a similar operational context. In all
cases, the knowledge must be sufficient to allow them to fulfill their
legal duty to act reasonably to identify, prevent, or stop the commission
of cyber war crimes."
There is utterly no reason not to apply this same reasoning to AWS. This
means that in order for designers, commanders, operators and others involved with
autonomous weapons to avoid liability, the devices-like any weapon-must be
designed and tested so that their expected actions against life and property can be
reasonably anticipated. This is nothing new to law of war practitioners. The
interpretation of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) of Article
36 of the Additional Protocol,52 for example, clearly indicates that testing is part of
the required review process for weapons of every sort."
The United States is quite demanding in this regard in order to ensure that
weapons are built and used in the proper manner:
[DoD] policy establishes rigorous standards for system design, testing of
hardware and software, and training of personnel on the proper use of
autonomous and semi-autonomous systems. Among other things, the
policy requires that military commanders use autonomous and semi-
autonomous weapon systems in a manner consistent with their design,
testing, certification, operator training, and doctrine.54
All of this points to the fact that nations that adhere to the law are going to do
rigorous testing and examination of autonomous weapons so that they do have a
reasonable understanding of how they work, and the foreseeable consequences of
their use. Absent such due diligence, those who use those weapons are liable for
the consequences if they perform inconsistent with the law of war.
In truth, it is not complicated to find command accountability for directing the
use of any weapon without a reasonable belief that doing so would comply with
the law of war. Commanders are, after all, expected to take "all necessary and
reasonable measures in their power" to prevent war crimes," and that implicitly
51. TALLINN MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE 94
(Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2013) [hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL].
52. Protocol 1, supra note 18, at art. 36.
53. See Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, supra note 26, at 951-52 (explaining the review
process for new weapons).
54. DOD MANUAL, supra note 20, § 6.5.9.4 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF DEF. DIRECTIVE 3000.09,
AUTONOMY IN WEAPONS SYSTEMS (Nov. 21, 2012)) (emphasis added).
55. Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Customary International Humanitarian Law Database,
ch. 43, r. 153, https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/vl_cha-chapter43_rule153 (last
visited Apr. 14, 2016).
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requires a reasonable understanding of the foreseeable consequences-something
that can be achieved via testing and other processes. In other words, HWR/IHRC's
belief that there can be no accountability because, in their view, autonomous
weapons can act "unforeseeably"'6 is obviously wrong because deploying a
weapon that is expected to launch attacks "unforeseeably" is itself a punishable
breach of the responsibilities of commanders, operators, and the nations they
represent.7
This is not to say that weapons do not go awry from time to time, but that is
not now, nor ever has been, a crime provided reasonable steps have been taken to
avoid such an unintended result. It is a fact of war that weapons do not always
operate as intended.59 But holding someone criminally accountable when a weapon
produces consequences that were unforeseeable despite a rigorous regime of
testing that indicated that the device would perform in compliance with the law is
simply unjust.
HRW/IHRC also apparently thinks "[c]riminal liability would likely apply
only in situations where the humans specifically intended to use the robots to
violate the law."" That is not how criminal law works. For example, under the U.S.
Uniform Code of Military Justice (Code)fo-which in this respect is much like the
criminal law of civilian jurisdictions around the globe 6-the death of another
human being can be criminalized in a number of ways. To illustrate_ under Article
118 of the Code, criminal liability can be found where the accused kills under
circumstances where he engages in "an act which is inherently dangerous to
another and evinces a wanton disregard of human life." 62 This is but one way a
member of the armed forces could be punished for loosing a lethal autonomous
weapon without verifying that its operational parameters would comply with the
law of war.
Article 119 (manslaughter) criminalizes behavior wherein the accused "who,
without an intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm" nevertheless "unlawfully kills
a human being ... by culpable negligence." " Thus, involuntary manslaughter may
be established by "a negligent act or omission which, when viewed in the light of
human experience, might foreseeably result in the death of another, even though
death would not necessarily be a natural and probable consequence of the act or
56. See MIND THE GAP, supra note 14, at 19 (explaining that autonomous weapons could
launch unforeseeably).
57. See id. at 20 (explaining that a commander or operator would be responsible for
deploying a robot if the decision under the circumstances amounted to an intentional commission
of an attack).
58. See, e.g., Ulrike Dauer, German City Evacuated After Unexploded World War II Bomb
Is Found, WALL ST. J. (May 27, 2015, 12:25 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/german-city-
evacuated-after-unexploded-world-war-ii-bomb-is-found-1432743938.
59. MIND THE GAP, supra note 14, at 37.
60. See generally 10 U.S.C. § 801 (2006), etseq.
61. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 918 (2014); 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (2003).
62. 10 U.S.C. § 918 (2014).
63. 10 U.S.C. § 919.
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omission."" It is really not difficult to see how criminal liability could be imposed
65
on anyone involved in the culpably negligent use of an autonomous weapon.
Additionally, in a provision somewhat unique to U.S. military law, criminal
liability can also be imposed upon an accused who causes death merely through
simple negligence-even in the absence of any intent to kill or injure.6 6 "Simple
negligence" is defined as follows:
Simple negligence is the absence of due care, that is, an act or omission
of a person who is under a duty to use due care which exhibits a lack of
that degree of care of the safety of others which a reasonably careful
person would have exercised under the same or similar circumstances.
Simple negligence is a lesser degree of carelessness than culpable
negligence."
As an example of the extent to which criminal liability can be extended, an
accused was convicted of negligent homicide merely because he lent "his car to a
drunken driver who kills himself in an automobile accident."6 Consequently, there
can be no dispute that a military member who employs (or allows others to
employ) an autonomous weapon without being reasonably sure it could and would
be used in a way that complies with the law of war can be held accountable. In
United States v. Kick,6 the all-civilian Court of Military Appeals explained why, in
the military setting, it was necessary to criminalize behavior that breached the
relatively low standard of simple negligence:70
There is a special need in the military to make the killing of another as a
64. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES (2012 EDITIoN), art.
44.119c(2)(a)(i), http://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/pdf/mcm.pdf [hereinafter MCM] (emphasis
added). The Manual states that:
Culpable negligence is a degree of carelessness greater than simple negligence. It is a
negligent 'act or omission accompanied by a culpable disregard for the foreseeable
consequences to others of that act or omission. Thus, the basis of a charge of involuntary
manslaughter may be a negligent act or omission which, when viewed in the light of human
experience, might foreseeably result in the death of another, even though death would not
necessarily be a natural and probable consequence of the act or omission. Acts which may
amount to culpable negligence include negligently conducting target practice so that the
bullets go in the direction of an inhabited house within range; pointing a pistol in jest at
another and pulling the trigger, believing, but without taking reasonable precautions to
ascertain, that it would not be dangerous; and carelessly leaving poisons or dangerous drugs
where they may endanger life.
Id
65. I disagree with Rebecca Crootof, who argues: "Autonomous weapon systems may
commit a serious violation of international humanitarian law without anyone acting intentionally
or recklessly. Absent such willful action, no one can-or should-be held criminally liable."
Rebecca Crootof, War Torts, U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016). Among other things, as this
article illustrates, U.S. military law has long provided for criminal liability for simple negligence,
a markedly lower standard of culpability than recklessness. Id.
66. MCM, supra note 64, at art. 85.134(c)(1).
67. Id. at art. 85.134(c)(2).
68. U.S. v. Martinez, 42 M.J. 327, 329-30 (C.A.A.F. 1995); Charles Dunlap Jr., When Does
an Unsafe Act Become a Crime?, TORCH MAG. 14 (Apr. 2001).
69. U.S. v. Kick, 7 M.J. 82 (C.M.A. 1979).
70. Id at 89.
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result of simple negligence a criminal act. This is because of the
extensive use, handling and operation in the course of official duties of
such dangerous instruments as weapons, explosives, aircraft, vehicles,
and the like. The danger to others form careless acts is so great that
society demands protection.
This illustrates how existing U.S. military law anticipates and recognizes the
dangerous potentialities of weaponry, and imposes accountability even totally
absent the "intentionality" HRW/IHRC wrongly thinks must be present to impose
criminal liability." Indeed, this is just a sampling of the myriad of ways that-
contrary to what Mind the Gap implies-any competent prosecutor could
successfully pursue accountably when a fully autonomous weapon is employed.
C. Civil Accountability
HRW/IHRC's section on civil accountability suffers from a number of
conceptual and technical defects. It is claimed that individual civil damages-by
victims of an illicit use of an autonomous weapon could not "fill the gap" they
perceive to exist in the criminal law.7 3 Their discussion mainly centers on the
complexity of U.S. tort liability litigation generally, rather than anything to do with
weapons' law or the law of war.74
Ironically, in the civil arena, Nevada has passed legislation imposing not just
criminal liability in 'driverless' car situations, but also civil liability.s And while in
theory driverless cars may not be technically 'fully' autonomous, as a practical
matter, they increasingly are so, defacto, because a driver's capability to intervene
atrophies over time to the point of ineffectiveness. 6 Be that as it may, the issue in
Nevada seems to be not, as Mind the Gap argument might suppose, too little
potential liability, but too much."
It is a mistake to underestimate the energy and creativeness of the American
plaintiffs bar. The recent Arab Bank case demonstrates that litigants are
increasingly figuring out ways to successfully obtain civil judgments for
international atrocities and other crimes.' There is, however, a dark side to civil
71. Id. at 84.
72. See MIND THE GAP, supra note 14, at 18 (explaining that independent intentionality
must accompany the commission of criminal acts in order to establish criminal liability).
73. See id. (explaining that punishments under civil liability do not achieve enough
penalties or social condemnation as compared to criminal liability).
74. See id (touching only briefly on the laws of war).
75. Kyle Colonna, Note, Autonomous Cars and Tort Liability, 4 CASE W. RES. J. L. TECH.
& INTERNET 81, 82 (2013).
76. See Frank Douma & Sarah Aue Palodichuk, Criminal Liability Issues Created by
Autonomous Vehicles, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1157, 1162 (2012) ("In the auto-pilot scenario,
however, there is a spectrum of override responsibility that could be placed upon the driver.").
77. See Colonna, supra note 75, at 83-84 (discussing various liability issues arising in
Nevada from autonomous cars, which range from liability for the conduct of the owner of the
autonomous car to products liability of the manufacturer of the vehicle).
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litigation in such cases. One scholar wrote in the Georgetown Public Policy
Review recently that such civil litigation may benefit individuals, but "the overall
effect can be damaging to relationships with key regional partners and weaken the
United States' capacity to investigate terror financing." 9
In any event, even if there was an absence of civil liability in the case of harm
caused during an international armed conflict, that is a broader issue than
autonomous weapons or, for that matter, any weapon. In fact, internationally
speaking, civil liability for even mass torts is extremely problematic.8 ' The absence
of civil liability of the sort HRW/IHRC seems to think is needed is hardly a reason
to ban autonomous weapons.
More specifically as to the law of war, there is virtually no empirical
evidence-and Mind the Gap offers none-that civil liability plays any significant
role in the shaping of belligerent behavior in the conduct of armed conflict,
especially with respect to deterrence." As U.S. District Court Judge Jose A.
Cabranes wrote recently in Foreign Affairs, "few evildoers are deterred by the
distant threat of monetary damages in civil litigation." 82
Of course, it is basic international law that a State which is "responsible for an
internationally wrongful act is under an obligation to make full reparation for the
injury caused by that act"-and that this principle can apply to law of war
violations.8 ' The adjudication of such claims is not, however, necessarily bound by
the civil law procedures that HRW/IHRC supposes would hamstring such
resolutions. Indeed, state parties can settle the claims by whatever procedure they
deem appropriate and find mutually acceptable.'
That said, it is profoundly misleading to suggest that international law calls
for the individual compensation for war crimes. The DoD Manual correctly points
out that:
The responsibility of States for violations of the law of war committed
by their agents is owed to other States. The fact that such responsibility
is owed to other States reflects the predominately inter-State nature of
international obligations. Customary international law and the 1949
Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/15/nyregion/arab-
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Policy, FOREIGN AFFAIRS 125 (Sept./Oct. 2015), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2015-
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84. See MIND THE GAP, supra note 14, at 35-36 (discussing the implementation of a no-
fault compensation system to ensure civil liability in international law).
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Geneva Conventions do not provide a private right for individuals to
claim compensation directly from a State; rather, such claims are made
by other States.
The point is that international relations, not to mention the legitimacy of the
law of war, has never depended upon the ability of courts to provide individual
compensation, even in the absence of criminal liability. In short, the presence or
absence of civil liability is not-and should not be-a necessary condition as to the
legitimacy of autonomous weapons.
III. CONCLUSION
It is certainly legitimate-and desirable-to raise questions about autonomous
weapons. There are clearly very real complexities associated with the emergence
of these devices and their potential uses in warfare." However, the notion that
there is something intrinsic about them that bars accountability is simply untrue.
Manufacturing faux "legal" issues does not advance the dialogue; indeed, as
Professor Schmitt suggests, they "muddle" the issues.
It appears that autonomous weapons' opponents are grasping at almost any
theory to justify a total ban on the technology." Historically, such an approach has
proven problematic as at best, because such bans are put in place based on a
technological understanding at a specific moment in time. It is quite possible that
technology could evolve over time to the point where the ban may actually operate
to bar the development or deployment of systems that could operate to save lives
of combatants and civilians alike. This is why I have advocated that focus ought to
be placed not on a particular technology, but rather on strict adherence to the law
of war as to its use.
The fact of the matter is that these weapons are here to stay. As one former
Army officer recognizes:
The technology is already here, and advances in Al [artificial
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intelligence] in general will create an environment where the continuous
development of defensive capabilities will be mandatory. We can't
uninvent deep learning, image recognition algorithms, and
supercomputers-despite the FLI's sincere but misguided attempt to stop
advancements in autonomous weapon system development. 92
Among some NGOs and others in the international community there seems to
be an instinctive hostility to any technological advance in war fighting, despite the
paucity of evidence that increased lethality of weapons necessarily causes more
civilians to die violently. In fact, Professor Ian Morris has argued persuasively that
in the long run "wars make us safer and richer," because they force the societal
organization and sophistication that ultimately functions to suppress human
violence.9 '
It is worth noting that the march of time toward a safer society that Morris
examines parallels the increasing technological nature of weaponry. Moreover,
Martin Van Creveld points out that the existence of lethal instruments, even
weapons with such horrific potential as nuclear bombs, have resulted in the
disappearance of the most deadly form of conflict: major interstate war.9 4 High-
tech is not necessarily to be feared as inextricably endangering civilians.
That being the case, rather than searching for reasons to ban sophisticated
weapons, we ought to work to find sensible regulations for them, ever conscious of
the grim reality that even in the modem era, some of the worst atrocities have been
carried out using not some piece of high-tech weaponry, but the most primitive of
implements.95 It is equally true that in the militaries-such as those of the United
States and its allies-that have actually tried to suppress man's inhumanity to man,
now rely to a great degree on high-tech weaponry to apply force as precisely as
possible in order to spare civilians.
As John Stuart Mill observes, "as long as justice and injustice have not
terminated their ever-renewing fight for ascendancy in the affairs of mankind,
human beings must be willing, when need is, to do battle for the one against the
other."9' We ought not be working to ban the law-abiding nations from seeking to
have robots, rather than their young people serving in uniform, doing some of that
fighting for justice for us.
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